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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, which 
petition was dismissed by order of the district court on November 
13, 1989. This appeal is from that order. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(g) of the Utah Judicial Code (Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-2a-
3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the appellant had a protected liberty interest 
at stake in his parole eligibility hearing which would subject 
the hearing to the procedural protections of due process? 
2. Whether the actions of the Board of Pardons during the 
appellant's parole eligibility hearing violated the Board's 
enabling statutes? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use without just compensation. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
1 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, aro citizens uf 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE L 
Sec. 7. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-1 
(r)| "Expiration' orcurs when the maximum sentence has run 
UTAH CODE ANN, U -Al -7 
(2) Before reaching a final decision to release any 
offender under this chapter, the board shall cause the offender 
to appear before it or any appointed hearing officer, and shall 
personally interview him to consider his fitness for release, and 
verify as far as possible information furnished from other 
sources. Any offender may waive a personal appearance before the 
Board of Pardons. Any offender outside of the state shall, if 
ordered by the Board of Pardons, submit to a courtesy hearing to 
be held by the appropriate authority in the jurisdiction in which 
the offender is housed in lieu of an appearance before the board. 
Rules to carry out this section shall be made by the board. The 
offender shall be promptly notified in writing of the board's 
decision. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-9 
(1) The Board of Pardons may pardon or parole any offender 
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to 
a penal or correctional facility which is under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Corrections for a felony or class A 
misdemeanor except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2). The 
release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board, 
which shall consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. 
However, a prisoner may submit his own application, subject to 
the rules uf the board. 
UTAH CODE ANN, ZlsA I ' "l 
(3) The determinations and decisions of the Board of 
Pardons in cases involving approval or denial of any action
 r of 
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, 
orders of restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and 
restitution, are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in th i ti 
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section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Mr. Humphries was convicted of issuing a bad check by the 
Second Judicial District Court of Davis County. After his parole 
eligibility hearing before the Utah Board of Pardons on March 24, 
1989, Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the Third Judicial District Court, challenging the Board's 
actions in determining his parole date. Mr. Humphries claimed 
that the Board inappropriately considered his prior criminal 
record because the outcome of three of the twenty incidents 
reported in the record had not been verified. The outcomes were 
reported in the record as per Mr. Humphries' interpretation, and 
the record noted that these outcomes were not verified one way or 
the other. 
Pursuant to the State's motion, the district court dismissed 
Mr. Humphries' petition by order dated November 13, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Humphries claims that the Board of Pardons' actions in 
considering evidence which had not been fully verified violated 
the due process provisions of the state and federal 
constitutions, as well as the enabling statutes the Board 
operates under. However, due process guarantees were 
inapplicable to Mr. Humphries' parole hearing since those 
guarantees only apply to government actions which may deprive a 
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person of "liberty" or "property." Both the federal and Utah 
state courts have determined that a defendant who has been duly 
convicted and sentenced to a term of incarceration has no 
protected liberty interest in being released prior to the 
expiration of his sentence, unless the state's parole statute 
limits the discretion of the parole board such that an inmate is 
legitimately entitled to parole upon meeting certain specified 
conditions. Because Utah's parole statute leaves the decision 
whether to parole inmates almost entirely up to the discretion of 
the Board of Pardons, the statute does not vest inmates with a 
protected liberty interest in parole, and parole hearings are not 
subject to the protections of due process. 
Mr. Humphries' claim that the actions of the Board of 
Pardons in considering his allegedly inaccurate criminal record 
violated the Board's enabling statutes, is insubstantial because 
he fails to specify any provision violated by such action. In 
fact, the actions which appellant complains of were in full 
compliance with the standards and procedures established for the 
Board in section 77-27-7(2) of the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
In any case, Mr. Humphries suffered no harm from the Board's 
consideration of this record, since he was allowed to, and did, 
contest the accuracy of his criminal record before the Board. 
Finally, Mr. Humphries' appeal must be dismissed because 
Board of Pardons' decisions regarding parole are not subject to 
judicial review. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Humphries' Petition claims that the Board of Pardons 
deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
without due process. "Liberty interests protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources—the Due Process 
Clause itself and the laws of the States." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 
U.S. 460, 466 (1983). The Board of Pardon's decision could not 
have deprived the appellant of a constitutional right protected 
by due process, because an inmate's desire in being paroled is 
not a protected "liberty interest," under either the federal Due 
Process Clause, Utah's due process provision, or Utah's Parole 
Statute. 
I. NO LIBERTY INTEREST IN PAROLE EXISTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
In determining whether a protected interest arises under the 
Due Process Clause, "[t]he question is . . . whether the nature 
of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty 
or property language of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (Citation Omitted). In 
answering this question, it is important to remember that 
"[w]hile no State may 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law,' it is well settled that 
only a limited range of interests fall within this provision." 
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466 (Citation omitted). In order to obtain a 
protected liberty interest "a person clearly must have more than 
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a 
5 
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents v. Roth/ 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that "there 
is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to 
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 
sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). The Court went on to 
explain why a parole grant applicant has no constitutional 
entitlement at stake in his parole hearing: 
The natural desire of an individual to be released is 
indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being 
confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural 
safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: 
"[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has 
been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 
215, 224 (1976)). 
The appellant does not deny receiving full due process 
protection during the proceedings in which he was convicted and 
sentenced. In those proceedings, the plaintiff was 
constitutionally deprived of his right to not be incarcerated 
until the expiration of his sentence. Under Utah's parole 
statute, "'[e]xpiration' occurs when the maximum sentence has 
run." Utah Code Annotated, sec. 77-27-1(5) (1953 as amended). 
The appellant had a hope of being paroled before the lawful 
expiration of his sentence. However, due process does not 
guarantee such a hope. "Process is not an end in itself. Its 
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to 
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which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement." 
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). The appellant had 
no legitimate claim of entitlement to parole because he had been 
constitutionally deprived of this right for the duration of his 
sentence. He only had a hope of parole, an expectation which is 
not within the contemplation of the "liberty" language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
II. NO LIBERTY INTEREST IN PAROLE EXISTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7. 
While it is true that this Court could construe the Utah 
Constitution to include the mere anticipation or hope of being 
paroled within the contemplation of the "liberty" language of its 
due process provision, the Court has not previously done so. To 
the contrary, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have expressly followed the rule set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Greenholtz, supra. In Homer v. Morris, 
684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"[b]efore a parole date has been established, an inmate has no 
constitutional right to be placed on parole." Homer, 684 P.2d at 
66. (Citing Greenholtz). Recently, the Court of Appeals cited 
Greenholtz for the rule that "'there is no constitutional or 
inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released 
before the expiration of a valid sentence.' Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 
at 7, 99 S. Ct. at 2104." Hatch v. Deland, Case No. 890626-CA, 
p. 3, Ct. Ap. Memorandum Decision filed March 19, 1990 (For 
Publication). It is clear that under Utah law, as well as United 
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States law, the appellant has no right to parole that is subject 
to due process protections. For the purposes of due process, a 
protected interest in parole simply does not exist. 
III. UTAH'S PAROLE STATUTE DOES NOT CREATE A LIBERTY INTEREST IN 
BEING GRANTED PAROLE. 
Even though no inherent liberty interest in parole exists by 
virtue of either the Utah or United States Constitutions, such an 
interest may be created by state law. When a state's parole 
statute and regulatory provisions limit the discretion of the 
parole board, mandating release of inmates once certain specified 
conditions are met, courts may find a protected liberty interest 
in being paroled. When such a liberty interest is found, the 
Supreme Court has determined that some degree of due process 
applies, the measure of which depends on the nature and extent of 
the interest found. For example, in Greenholtzf supra, the Court 
held that Nebraska's parole statute created an expectation of 
release, which expectancy interest required that inmates have, 
first, the right to be heard at their parole grant proceedings, 
and second to be informed of the reasons if they are denied 
parole. However, the Court went on to hold that the Constitution 
required no more than these two procedural safeguards. 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 
When a state's parole statute lacks such mandatory language 
and leaves the parole decision in the discretion of the Board of 
Pardons, no protected liberty interest is created. Board of 
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 379, nt. 10 (1987). 
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Appellant claims that Utah law does create a protected 
liberty interest in an inmate's expectation of parole, which 
would require Utah's Board of Pardons to heed certain procedural 
safeguards during parole grant proceedings. This assertion 
contradicts the holdings of both the Tenth Circuit and Utah state 
courts, which have determined that Utah's parole statute does not 
give rise to a protected liberty interest. Most recently, this 
rule was clearly set forth in Hatch v. Deland, Case No. 890626-
CA, Ct. Ap. Memorandum Decision filed March 19, 1990 (For 
Publication). 
[Ajbsent statutory language limiting a parole board's 
discretion, H[t]here is no constitutional or inherent 
right of a convicted person to be conditionally 
released before the expiration of a valid sentence." 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S. Ct. at 2104. . . . 
Utah's parole statute contains no statutory limitations 
on the Board's discretion to grant or deny parole. 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 77-27-9(1) (Supp. 1989) provides, 
in relevant part: "The Board of Pardons may pardon or 
parole any offender or commute or terminate the 
sentence of any offender committed to a penal or 
correctional facility which is under the jurisdiction 
of the Department of Corrections for a felony or a 
class A misdemeanor . . . ." The statute precludes 
parole for certain offenses until the minimum term for 
the offense has been served. Under the controlling 
precedents, we hold that the Utah parole statute does 
not create an "expectation of parole" that would 
subject parole board proceedings to due process 
protections. See also. Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 1287, 
1290 (10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 885 
(1984) (concluding that the previous Utah parole 
statute did not create a liberty interest subject to 
due process protections). 
Hatch v. Deland, Case No. 890626-CA, Ct. Ap. Memorandum Decision 
filed March 19, 1990, at 3 (For Publication). This holding is in 
accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's construction of Utah's 
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Parole Statute in State v. Schreuder, 712 P. 2d 264, 277 (Utah 
1985), holding that Utah's "sentencing system vests almost 
complete discretion in the Board of Pardons to determine the 
period of time that will actually be served." Since Utah's 
parole statute does not give inmates a protected liberty interest 
in parole, appellant's parole hearing was not subject to due 
process guarantees and his claim that he was denied due process 
is unfounded. 
IV. NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OCCURRED IN ANY EVENT. 
The appellant's claim in this case is that the Board of 
Pardons improperly relied upon prior erroneous convictions in 
setting his parole date. This argument is meritless. The 
appellant was allowed at the hearing to challenge whatever 
portions of his criminal record he felt were inaccurate. The 
appellant has been allowed to do this all along. Even in the 
preparation of the appellant's presentence investigation report 
(Appendix A), the petitioner was allowed to dispute his record 
and have that dispute noted. The investigator expressly stated 
in the report: 
NOTE: The defendant had a copy of his NCIC 
records, and during the interview with this agent, he 
went through each case and shared his opinion of the 
disposition of these cases. Whenever there has been a 
question as to the disposition, this agent has placed 
in parenthesis the results of that particular case as 
per the defendant's interpretation. This agent has not 
been able to substantiate by a third party the 
information in parenthesis. 
In effect the appellant disputed the entries in his criminal 
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record to the Board of Pardons. Because of this no prejudice to 
Mr. Humphries resulted. 
V. THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS WERE IN COMPLETE 
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH LAW. 
Appellant claims that the actions of the Board of Pardons in 
considering his less-than-completely-verified criminal record 
violated the enabling statutes of the Board. The transparency of 
this claim is demonstrated by the fact that the appellant could 
not specify any particular statutory provision that was violated. 
He only makes the general allegation that the Board has violated 
Utah law, and cites Andrews v. Haun, 779 P.2d 229 (1989) for the 
proposition that the Board must abide by the statutes which 
created it. Respondents do not contest the Andrews proposition, 
but they fail to see in what manner the Board has violated Utah 
statutes. In fact, the actions of the Board were expressly in 
accordance with the Board's enabling statutes, which provide: 
Before reaching a final decision to release any 
offender under this chapter, the board shall cause the 
offender to appear before it or any appointed hearing 
officer, and shall personally interview him to consider 
his fitness for release, and verify as far as possible 
information furnished from other sources. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated, section 77-27-7(2) (1953, as 
amended)(Emphasis added). Utah's parole statute does not require 
that the evidence it considers meet admissibility standards 
applicable to the courts. The statute expressly requires that 
the board verify "as far as possible" the information it receives 
from sources other than the parole applicant. The Board did 
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this. The agent submitting the appellant's criminal record to 
the Board verified it as far as possible, and he carefully noted 
those entries which he was unable to substantiate. Since this is 
all that the statute requires, appellant's allegation that the 
Board somehow violated its enabling statutes by considering his 
partially unverified criminal record is simply not true. The 
Board's actions were in full compliance with Utah's parole 
statutes. 
VI. MR. HUMPHRIES APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE BOARD OF 
PARDONS' DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
When a person has been sentenced to a term at the Utah State 
Prison, the Utah Board of Pardons is the entity which determines 
the exact length of time the person serves. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-27-5(3) (1953 as amended) states: 
The determinations and decisions of the Board of 
Pardons in cases involving approval or denial of any 
action, of paroles, pardons, commutations or 
terminations of sentence, orders of restitution, or 
remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, are 
not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this 
section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a 
c ivi1 j udgment. 
See State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
Mr. Humphries challenges the decision of the Board of 
Pardons in setting a particular a parole date. Mr. Humphries 
apparently believes he should have been given an earlier date. 
The challenge, obviously, is a request to the Court to review a 
parole decision made by the Utah Board of Pardons. Under U.C.A. 
§77-27-5(3) such a decision is not subject to judicial review. 
12 
Thus, Mr. Humphries' challenge must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's claim of a denial of due process must fail, 
since, absent a constitutional or statutorily created entitlement 
to parole, due process was inapplicable to his parole grant 
hearing. Likewise, appellant's claim that the Board violated 
Utah statutes is meritless. Not only did the Board comply with 
the standards and procedures established in U.C.A. section 77-27-
7(2), the appellant has failed to specify any statutory provision 
that the Board's actions did violate. Having failed to show that 
the Board of Pardons violated any constitutional or statutory 
provision in determining his parole date, appellant's petition 
was appropriately dismissed by the district court. Finally, the 
appellant's challenge to the Board of Pardons decision regarding 
his parole is improper under U.C.A. §77-27-5(3). Respondents 
respectfully request this Court to affirm the District Court's 
order. 
DATED THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL, 1990. 
me Noli C/ Dan lan 
ssistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to: 
E. JAY SHEEN 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner\ 
Appellant 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
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PAGE 5 
PRESENTENCE REPORT 
TEOKAS ROBERT HUMPHRIES 
Law Enforcement - Continued 
bad checks. Further investigation indicated the defendant may have passed 
as many as 20 additional checks. Detective 3arton was convinced the 
defendant knew exactly what he was doing, and that this was not his first 
attempt at passing bad checks. Detective Barton was adamant in his feelings 
that the defendant should go to orison. 
PRIOR RECORD: 
A. JUVENILE: A check with the Utah Juvenile Court System 
revealed no prior record; however, discussion with the defendant and copies 
of TWX's and criminal records in possession of the defendant reveals the 
following arrests: 
DATE 
5-20-71 
6-28-71 
11-26-71 
1-20-72 
4-2-72 
5-8-72 
PLACE 
Redford, Michigan 
Livonia, Michigan 
Redford, Michigan 
Clearwater, FL 
OFFENSE 
Stolen Property 
Dangerous Drugs 
Dangerous Drugs 
Shoplifting 
Ft* Lauderdale, FL DDC (Drunk & 
Disorderly Conduct) 
DISPOSITION 
Convicted 
30 days jail 
Not guilty 
(per defendant) 
$157 fine 
30 days jail 
$27 fine 
Detroit, Michigan Att. Carrying Concealed 5 yrs. probation 
Weapon 
B. ADULT: check with the Utah Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, the Ogden City Police Department, Adult Probation and 
Parole, and TWXfs sent to Michigan, California, and Florida revealed the 
following adult offenses: 
DATE 
7-13-72 
7-1-74 
7-19-74 
PLACE OFFENSE 
Dangerous Drugs Livonia, MI 
Santa Cruz, CA 
San Francisco, CA Poss. of Heroin 
Drunk Driving 
Resisting Arrest 
DISPOSITION 
Not guilty 
(per defendant) 
12 mos. probation 
$345 fine 
Dismissed 
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PRESENTENCE REPORT 
TEOMAS ROBERT HUMPHRIES 
Prior Record - continued 
DATE PLACE •"~M.c;; 
6-17-76 Henderson, NV DWI 
NOTE: The defendant indicates the case is under acoeal. 
5-7-79 
11-9-81 
10-20-82 
12-21-82 
1-11-83 
3-14-83 
4-8-85 
6-18-87 
Oregon City, OR Carrying a Concealed 
weaoon 
Springfield, 
Oregon City, 
Oregon City, 
Springfield, 
Oregon City, 
OR 
OR 
OR 
OR 
OR 
DCS 
XI/DOS 
Assault 
DOS 
Assault 
Oregon City, OR 
San Jose, CA 
Criminal Mischief 
DUI/DOS 
False Info, to P.O. 
Stolen Property 
DUX 
DISPOSITION 
Convicted 
Mot guilty 
(per defendant) 
Convicted 
Convicted 
Dismissed 
Convicted 
Dismissed 
Unknown 
8 mos. jail 
Santa Clara Co., CA 
NOTE: Mr. Humphries has two warrants for his arrest out of the Santa Clara 
County Sheriff's Office. They do not wish to extradite the defendant. He is 
a walk-away from the Probation Department Community Service Program. He 
served from June 18, 1987, until December 9, 1987, for a Possession of Stolen 
Property and a DUI conviction. This information was provided by Deputy Marta 
MoGrath, Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department on November 21, 1988 at 1606 
hours* 
4-15-88 
9-14-88 
Ogden, Utah Assault 
Farmington, Utah Bad Checks 
30 days jail 
Current offense 
NOTE: The defendant had a copy of his NCIC records, ar.d during the interview 
with this agent, he went through each case and shared his opinion of the 
disposition of these cases. Whenever there has been a question as to the 
disposition, this agent- has placed in parenthesis the results of that 
particular case as per the defendant's interpretation. This agent has nou. 
been able to substantiate by a third party the information in parenthesis. 
